неділя, 26 лютого 2023 р.

WILL THE ANTI-RUSSIAN SANCTIONS SAVE THE WEST AND WILL THIS HAVE AN INFLUENCE OVER THE FURTHER KREMLIN’S AGGRESSION IN THE WORLD?

https://www.geopolitic.ro/2020/05/will-anti-russian-sanctions-save-west-will-influence-kremlins-aggression-world/#sdfootnote1anc


WILL THE ANTI-RUSSIAN SANCTIONS SAVE THE WEST AND WILL THIS HAVE AN INFLUENCE OVER THE FURTHER KREMLIN’S AGGRESSION IN THE WORLD?

Marian Zhytaryuk,

Doctor of Science in Social Communications, Full Professor, Head of Department of Foreign Press and Information Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Ukraine, https://orcid.org/0000-000 2-5690-5701

Victoria Zhytaryuk,

Master of Journalism, translation from Ukrainian, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3570-4521

Modern Russia, that is, Moscow, is frequently positioning itself as the Russian Empire, which understood only the language of force, weapons, violence, not partnership, negotiations and justice. Modern Moscow has recovered long ago from the USSR’s break-up in 1991, which the current and perhaps eternal and posthumous leader Vladimir Putin considers to be the “greatest geopolitical mistake” of the twentieth century. In this context, it is impossible to expect from the Kremlin nothing more than aggression, intimidation, blood and the horrors of domination.

If you go back into the history, it is easy to recall the March 8, 1169, when a military coalition of North-Russian principalities led by Vladimir-Suzdal prince Andrej Bogolyubsky began the robbery of Kiev, which lasted for five days and led to the city’s decline as ”the capital of ancient state”1 (https://www.jnsm.com.ua/h/0308N/), including the mass rape, slavery and murder of Kyiv women, mostly young2. It is also easy to recall the Mongol-Tatar burden (Golden Horde, 1237-1242), which, in fact, continued to realize the power of Moscow burden – both for the Slavic peoples and for others, mainly Tatars. There is also in native memory the destruction of Zaporizhzhya Sich (1775) as the Cossack state in general, and the seizure of a large part of the Caucasus and Crimea (1774), and Moscow’s approval on the northern Black Sea coast. The seizure of Bessarabia in 1812 was only the beginning of Moscow fable which was lasted for tens and hundreds times and which is still valid, about that it is the Russian tsar (ruler) who alone defends the interests of the Orthodox and protects Christians. There-fore, it is necessary to be afraid of Russian language, Russian Orthodoxy and Russian birch trees, because these symbols are capable to actualize the possible “defenses” of Moscovites in foreign lands, such as in Transnistria (last 25 years), in the Republic of Ichkeria (the end of XX – the beginning of XXI century), in Georgia (2008), in the Ukrainian Crimea (2014), in Donbass (from 2014 until now), in Syria (in recent years)…

In modern Russia, where the largest supplies of drinking water are concentrated, where there are most other natural reserves (oil, gas, gold, coal, ores of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, including gold, precious stones, first of all diamonds, wood), there are the largest area of the world, it turns out, that all this is not enough to just to live for itself, to make friends with neighbors, to improve the social standards of own citizens. Modern Russia needs new victories at any costs. She needs a victory to be the subject of new pride. And it is no matter how the Russians live, the main thing is in that they, more precisely their rulers and their weapons, should be feared all over the world!

It so happened that because of the Moscow aggression in Ukraine, the Kiev ruling clique did not obey and began an information confrontation, organized a positional confrontation with the separatist centers under the Kremlin patronage. Official Kyiv began to entreat for assistance. And sanctions were as a result of this.

There are many positions, valuations and admonitions in this regard, but I would recommend to pay attention to the research Sanctions against Russia: the current state, prospects, successes and gaps of the multilateral international sanctions regime against the Russian Federation, Kyiv, 2019[1] (http://icps.com.ua/assets/uploads/images/files/t_sankcii_rf_a4_ukr.pdf). Experts of the International Center for Prospect Studies – Mykola Kapitonenko, Anastasia Galushka, Yegor Kiyan, Maxim Stepanenko, of the Ukrainian Institute of the Future – Ilia Kusa, Igor Tyshkevich, Viktor Andrusiv; and of the “Sanctions 2020Initiatives – Anna Talimonchuk; and experts from the World Policy Institute and a number of other analytic centers participated in the preparation and discussion of this research.

We remember that in 2014, the USA, EU, Canada, Australia and several other countries harshly condemned to the Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, to the Donbas war, and imposed sanctions against the aggressor. Researchers say that economic, diplomatic and other sanctions have become a typical instrument of international policy to influence on the geopolitical decisions of the government against which they are directed. Despite the Russia’s important position in the international arena, the USA and EU have stated that they will not cancel the sanction regime for the time than Russia implementates the Minsk agreements and returns the annexed Crimean peninsula to Ukraine[2]. The impact of sanctions on the Russian economy is much talked about, but it is difficult to establish their effectiveness at the economic and political levels. At the same time, efficiency is a key component, since sanctions are first of all a means to cease and to stop the Russian aggression and to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The sanctions themselves were not enough to change Russia’s foreign policy. Even so, the authors ask the question: does this mean that sanctions are completely ineffective? And they replied: Although the sanctions did not affect on the Russia’s behavior, they were still effective. Despite the negative impact of sanctions on the Russian economy compared to 2014, was worldwide observed, the caused economic damage was not enough to change Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. It can be assumed that the sanctions against Russia have not yet reached their full potential due to their insufficient impact on the Russian economy and political class. But what’s next: tightening of the sanctions, maintaining the status quo, or gradually their mitigation? Modifications to strength more efficient and to mitigate the less effective instruments? What will be the conditions for the decisions of the multilateral sanctions against Russia?[3]

The question is, of course, urgent, but, in response to the inculcation of sanctions against the Russian Federation, Moscow, for the first, emphasize a humanitarian catastrophe, by provoking and stimulating the uncontrolled flow of migrants (again by terror and killing, like Vladimir Lenin) in Syria, displaying military power, involving the navy and aviation. For the second, by fair means or foul (by finance and oil dependency of the old world, that is by political corruption) it stores its place in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. For the third, Moscow resolved the Law on Non-recognition on the Russian territory the decisions of international courts, including the European Court of Human Rights: Under the new decree, which was released on the December 15, 2019, the Constitutional Court of Russia is authorized to decide on the possibility or impossibility of implementation of the decisions of international courts. Simplier to say, if the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation finds that the ECtHR has resolved an unlawful decision, then it will not be necessary to implement such a decision”[4] (https://sovetnik.eu/rossiya-poluchila-pravo-ne-priznavat-resheniya-espch.html). You can also enumerate other versions of demonstrating the impregnability of official Moscow: intransigence in the Minsk negotiation process, especially in the question of election, security and borders, fighting in Donbass, obviously, the achievement of secret diplomacy of the Russian Federation in negotiations with the West countries in consequence of this it is possible to observe weakening of the the influence of the latter on the eastern vector, in particular, the USA ignoring the interests of the Kurds, the beginning of the withdrawal of USA military (and after them – representatives of the Western coalition) from Afghanistan, withdrawing from the international obligations to reduce and nonspread of nuclear power, unprecedented modernization of weapons, warming in relations with some leaders of the EU, including French President Emanuel Macron, the actual legalization of the State Duma’s decision to stay retain V. Putin for ever on a post of a state chairman.

Moscovia, as before, as ever, needs a tsar. Moscovia cannot be satisfied with the language of negotiations, persuasions, diplomatic methods. It will always strive to impose on the world its values-traditions that will have importance if the Moscovites dominate – in the regional, European, Middle Eastern, world dimension. Until then, the Moscovites will fight for the dreams of their tsar and their authorities to become reality. The choice of forces, tools and means is no longer a question. If it is necessary to punish or destroy the enemy, the Kremlin is ready to use even the nuclear weapons, because compatriots all the same will forgive this sacrifice for the sake of the idea of Slavic world”, triumph of Orthodoxy, even at the cost of their own lives, because they will get into paradise as martyrs[5]...

How, in this context, the position of the West, even, pro-Ukrainian and even anti-Putin, should be evaluated, but the position with which Putin is made advances, from which Putin is persuaded, from which Putin is trying to pacify, in a word, they do the same way they did before the Second World War with A. Hitler. The result of such a condemning-persuading-pasifing policy of the aggressor is well known to all. The West is once again approaching the same rake, trying to keep its face in an unpleasant situation. The West introduces sanctions as if against the Kremlin, but in reality against some individuals (not against all, but only a part!), which have political connections with Moscow authorities. It does not impose sectoral, banking sanctions, that is, it allows the Kremlin’s power to stay afloat and to cock a shook to the world. The West confirms its own inability or unwillingness to declare the Russian Federation its enemy. The West has never realized that, despite its advances to Moscow and its perception as an obstinate companion, the official Kremlin has long waged a hybrid war against the West - informational, cultural, historical and has chosen the territory of modern Ukraine as a field of local battles against the West, whose Ukraine that for some reason dared to show her aggressor her teeth.

The main purpose of sanctions, - as it is rightly stated in the above-mentioned research, - is to change the behavior of the state against which sanctions are directed[6]. Did Moscow’s behavior against Ukraine and the West diminish? The question is rhetorical.

By the way, the Ukrainian mass media (especially television), despite its considerable affiliation with the oligarchy, which in recent decades is de facto a rulling caste (political slogans, colors, rhetoric have changed, but not the essence – anti-national, anti-social, dehumanizing), however they were able to keep their hands on the pulse of life, taking in a principled patriotic, honest and professional position – Maidan-2004, Revolution of Dignity-2013-2014. Ukrainian media and social networks have learned how to catch politicians on lies, how to ask direct and awkward questions, how to demand explanation – including about the treason in the negotiations in Minsk, when it is said about the attempt to legitimize terrorist organizations from ORDLO (Separate areas of Donetsk and Luhansk areas), with so-called the LNR and the DNR[7]. But the problem with the Ukrainian media is that they remain local, separated from he world contexts, they in no way affect the formation of an agenda in the world. Recently, Ukrainian television has become almost inaccessible to Ukrainians as well, since January 2020 satellite channels of the leading national broadcasters have been encoded in Ukraine. If you want to watch –you must pay. So-called T2 decoders more or less provide signal in big cities, which is not the case with villages or remote areas.

In the context of understanding the place and role of Moscovia, I believe, that the thesis of an international security expert, candidate of political science, associate professor of the Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv, director of the Center for International Relations Research, a non-governmental organization dealing with regional security and of Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Mykola Kapitonenko is worthy of note. In the speech Russia’s Neighborhood Policy (Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty) on the Foreign Policy Portal web site (http://fpp.com.ua), in the section Generalized Conclusions, the author, in particular, notes that the situation in the region of Eastern Europe and in all the sub-regions important to Ukraine, including the Black Sea, is extremely difficult today. In the medium-term perspective it will remain the same, since the factors detemining the security profile are, for the first, the revisionist policy of Russia aimed at reviewing the current international institutes and norms, secondly, Russia’s long-term desire to maintain / strengthen control over the "near abroad" states and the Kremlin’s choice of methods to achieve this, for the third, the weakness of regional security structures, for the fourth, the lack of democracy in the region, and for the fifth, the crisis of confidence and the gradual transformation of regional policy into a zero-sum game[8].

The essence of the geopolitical insolence of the cessionary of the Soviet Union and tsarist Russia can be understood, but not justified. It is no secret for anyone that, being the largest state in the territory in the world, the largest military power in the region (for example, towards the 2017, Moscow spent more than $ 61 billion on the army, that’s five times more than Turkey and almost seven times more than Poland), but having an underdeveloped economy – about 2 percent of the world, Moscovia will try to maintain its leadership position in terms of influence at the expense of its closest neighbors, the so-called Near abroad, which do not go out beyond NATO member countries bounds, because the greatest regional potential of foreign policy of the Russian Federation is concentrated there[9]. M. Kapitenko rightly summarizes that the main goal of Putin’s policy is to strengthen or at least maintain its influence on the foreign and domestic policies of the Near abroad countries and this is possible under the conditions of implementation of a number of steps, which, for the first, are formulated in regulatory documents of Russia Federation, secondly, has emerged from the Kremlin’s foreign policy practices in recent years[10]. We are talking about the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016, in particular, about the part IV, devoted to regional priorities, and about the article by Vladimir Putin (it is also called programmatic!) The new integration project for Eurasia – the future that is born today(October 2011)[11].

As far as 2011, it became apparent to all the people in the world that Putin’s policy, that the policy of modern Moscovia, is the Soviet Union’s resuscitation policy, the policy of defining such an agenda in which the Kremlin should dominate on the Eurasian territory. These things could not be doubted after the war crimes and humanitarian catastrophes in Ichkeria, Abkhazia, Georgia, which Moscow used as a litmus test of the inadequacy, timeliness, indifference and cynicism of Western partners, which in the end did not particularly want to be involved into geopolitics peculiarities according to Moscow’s plan. As for me, the absence of a coherent Western front even then encourased the Kremlins new crimes, which continue to this day. These new crimes made the USA, Canada, the EU a little upset, and imposed light sanctions against the aggressor in Ukraine and Syria, but no more.

The key question is one: The West cannot or the West does not want to break the spine of a new imperial power with a center in Moscow?

If Putin understood that the West does not yet want to destroy Russia, then it would behave in the international arena, though brutally, with a challenge, but with caution. But if Putin realized that the West cannot (will not oppose) the Kremlin, then Putin would not stop at NATO borders, but would do everything to wreck both NATO and the EU. The only question is: when and how?

 

Bibliography

1.   «Зрада, крутіша за коронавірус»: мережі лютують через переговори в Мінську // BBC-Україна. 2020. 13 берез. URL: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-51871711

2.   Капітоненко Микола. Політика Росії щодо сусідніх держав (доктрина «обмеженого суверенітету»). URL: http://fpp.com.ua/polityka-rosiyi-shhodo-susidnih-derzhav-doktryna-obmezhenogo-suverenitetu/

3.   Крамар Олександр. Путін зробив ставку на реанімацію СРСР // Тиждень. 2011. 5 жовт. URL: https://tyzhden.ua/World/32268

4.   Росіяни-мученики – в рай, решта – здохнуть: Як Путін ядерну війну описував (ВІДЕО) // Депо.юа. 2018. 18 жовт. URL: https://www.depo.ua/ukr/svit/rosiyani-mucheniki-v-ray-reshta-zdohnut-yak-putin-yadernu-viynu-opisuvav-video-20181018855334

5.   Россия получила право не признавать решения ЕСПЧ. URL: https://sovetnik.eu/rossiya-poluchila-pravo-ne-priznavat-resheniya-espch.html.

6.   Санкції проти Росії. Нинішній стан, перспективи, успіхи та прогалини багатостороннього міжнародного санкційного режиму проти Російської Федерації. К., 2019. – 48 с. URL: http://icps.com.ua/assets/uploads/images/files/t_sankcii_rf_a4_ukr.pdf

7.   Цей день в історії: 8 березня 1169 р. Розорення Києва Андрієм Боголюбським. URL: https://www.jnsm.com.ua/h/0308N/

 



[1] Санкції проти Росії. Нинішній стан, перспективи, успіхи та прогалини багатостороннього міжнародного санкційного режиму проти Російської Федерації. К., 2019. – 48 с. URL: http://icps.com.ua/assets/uploads/images/files/t_sankcii_rf_a4_ukr.pdf

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Россия получила право не признавать решения ЕСПЧ. URL: https://sovetnik.eu/rossiya-poluchila-pravo-ne-priznavat-resheniya-espch.html.

[5] Росіяни-мученики – в рай, решта – здохнуть: Як Путін ядерну війну описував (ВІДЕО) // Депо.юа. 2018. 18 жовт. URL: https://www.depo.ua/ukr/svit/rosiyani-mucheniki-v-ray-reshta-zdohnut-yak-putin-yadernu-viynu-opisuvav-video-20181018855334

[7]Зрада, крутіша за коронавірус: мережі лютують через переговори в Мінську // BBC. Україна. 2020. 13 берез. URL: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-51871711

[8] Капітоненко Микола. Політика Росії щодо сусідніх держав (доктрина «обмеженого суверенітету»). URL: http://fpp.com.ua/polityka-rosiyi-shhodo-susidnih-derzhav-doktryna-obmezhenogo-suverenitetu/

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Див.: Крамар Олександр. Путін зробив ставку на реанімацію СРСР // Тиждень. 2011. 5 жовт. URL: https://tyzhden.ua/World/32268

1 Цей день в історії: 8 березня 1169 рРозорення Києва Андрієм Боголюбським. URL: https://www. jnsm. com.ua/h/0308N/

2 Isn’t it worth to Ukrainian women to ponder over that the day of the murder of hundreds and thousands of Ukrainian girls in Kyiv should still be celebrated as the so-called day of solidarity for women, or should it be declared as a Day of Mourning?

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